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While currently relocating to a building away from the center of Prague, since
1995, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) has been headquartered in the former

Czechoslovakian parliament building. The former President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav
Havel, invited the radios to move from Munich to Prague and occupy the parliament
building for a symbolic dollar a year rent. This gesture of historical irony is especially
appropriate in considering the history of international radio broadcasting: a building
representative of Communism was converted into the headquarters for radio stations
extolling the benefits of democratic media. This symbolic move signifies one of the
paradoxes of the twentieth century: the United States, the major financial contributor to
RFE/RL, profited from the broadcasting and ideological infrastructure developed by the
Soviet Union, and the medium intended to unify and spread Communist goals was
ultimately used against the system and contributed to the downfall of the regime.
To examine this phenomenon, this paper will consider the beginnings of two
forms of broadcasting: early Soviet and post-WWII programming by Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty. The importance of broadcasting was recognized from the early days
of Soviet power. Vladimir Lenin first advocated radio as a tool of national unification in
order to spread revolutionary ideas to far removed regions and target the illiterate
population. In the hands of democratic nations, radio transcended political and
geographical borders and effectively broadcasted information and news that had been
suppressed by the Soviet Union. RFE/RL's contribution I to the downfall of the Soviet
regime is an especially compelling example of historical irony, as Soviet Russia was the
first country to pioneer radio broadcasting for political purposes. Comparing RFE/RL's

I "Contribution" is used here extremely loosely. There is no statistical analysis, or any convincing fact-based evidence, of the extent to
which RFE/RL contributed to the dissolution of the USSR. What does exist, however, are theories postulated by scholars, and oral
interviews from people who lived in the countries in which RFE/RL broadcasted.

1

broadcasting strategies against those of the early Soviet Union uncovers notable overlaps
even though one broadcasting entity strove to construct a nation and the other to
deconstruct the political regime.
This exchange of information and ideas between countries led to a complex
relationship between international and domestic media and introduced instances where
the two blurred, combined, and when one served as a surrogate for the other. Radio Free
2
Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) filled the latter role for East European countries
and the republics of the Soviet Union and performed two important functions: they
provided their audiences with a democratic worldview by transmitting news sil enced by
the government "at home," and offered a chance for silenced voices (such as exiled
writers and political figures) to be heard. This presented a double-fronted attack against
communism. The U . S . government employed the intellectual emigre population (who had
been effectively silenced by their native governments), providing them with jobs
broadcasting back into their home countries, while at the same time transmitting
democratic ideas of Western origin.
Comparing early Soviet broadcasting strategies against those of RFE/RL's (and
American/Western broadcasting in general) uncovers notable overlaps in method, and
what is ultimately apparent is that propaganda can be packaged in a variety of guises,
including democracy. After the October Revolution of 1917, Vladimir Ilych Lenin began
to advocate the unique attributes of the radio as a form of national unification, which he
continued until his death in 1924. Exploring Lenin's role in the development of Soviet

2
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were separate broadcasting stations until 1976. As they are currently referred to as one entity,
for the sake of clarity for the modem reader, this paper will use the abbreviation RFE/RL when discussing generalities common to
both stations, and individual abbreviations when their history does not overlap.

2

3
radio necessitates the use of sources in Russian as the only intensive study of Lenin's
work toward connecting the Soviet Union by radio broadcasts in English is Thomas H.
Guback and Steven P. Hill's The Innovation of Broadcasting in the Soviet Union and the
Role of V. I. Lenin. In it, they examine the development of radio in the Soviet Union
from both political and economic perspectives. T.M. Gorj aeva's Istorija sovetskoj radiozurnalistiki (The History of Soviet Radio Journalism) is a collection of primary Russian
documents outlining the development of radio in Soviet Russia: excerpts from program
guides, letters from Lenin praising the new form of technology, and descriptions of
broadcasts moving toward governmental control, in addition to extensive coverage of
radio references in newspapers and speeches. Yuri Murashov's article "Sovetskii etos i
radiofikatsiia pis'ma" ("Soviet Ethos and the Radiofication of Letters") considers the
conversion of radio into the main form of Soviet leisure as a highly important political
goal. In a more extensive scholarly comparison of the beginning of Soviet radio
broadcasting and initial transmissions of RFE/RL, Soviet periodicals such as Govorit

SSSR (Here Speaks the USSR), Govorit Moskva (Here Speaks Moscow), and "hobby"
radio publications such as Radio ljubitel (Radio Enthusiast) could be used to compare
'

Soviet methods of propaganda to those used in the American Crusade for Freedom.

4

There is a wide variety of American overviews of media in the Soviet Union, and
while most of them are now outdated, they are useful not only in their information, but
also in the tone in which the information is conveyed. Mark Hopkins' Mass Media in the
Soviet Union provides a comprehensive view of various media sources--newspaper,
radio, television--in the Soviet Union, and how they were utilized to accomplish political

As far as I am aware.
A limitation of my research is a lack of Russian sources in Russian. Gorjaeva's compilation of ptimalY sources is a monumental,
vital resource, but given the opportunity to access archives in Russia would contribute to the span of my research.

3

4

3

agendas. Martin Ebon' s The Soviet Propaganda Machine covers all fonns of propaganda,
and is especially detailed in its coverage of Radio Moscow's World Service, and Soviet
domestic stations.

5

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty scholarship is rather limited in breadth for
many reasons. Scholars often attribute the absence of extensive scholarship on Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty to the secretive nature of the radios; at one point, the
radios were funded by the CIA, a fact not known publicly in America at the risk of public
outcry and fear of the population viewing the radios as merely government-funded
propaganda. Further, the very nature of radio means that primary documents are limited
to radio transcripts and recordings, held in Munich, Gennany until fairly recently when
the Hoover Institution sponsored their move to the Hoover Archives at Stanford
6
University. Why significant modem scholarship has not emerged as a result of access to
these archives is unknown, though a new release by the Hoover Institution Press,
Discovering the Hidden Listener: An Assessment of Radio Liberty and Western
Broadcasting to the USSR During the Cold War perhaps indicates a movement tovvard
7
reviving study of a relatively archaic fonn of communication.
The existing scholarship specifically pertaining to the history of RFE/RL often
takes the fonn of personal accounts combined with historical backgrounds, frequently by
8
people who have worked for RFE/RL in the past, or in international journalism such as:
Sig Mickelson's America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio

5 While my paper focuses on the beginnings of each radio (Soviet broadcasting and RFE/RL),
further study could be done on how (or
whether) the two mirrored each other after their idealistic beginnings.
6
hile I do not know the full contents of the archives, it can be assumed that the transcripts and recordings are not all in English, and
whlle many scholars may be polyglots, when the language count goes into the dozens, a comprehensive study of the archives would
be
.
dauntmg.
Even today, RFE/RL broadcasts in 21 countties.
7 In the age of modem technology, it may perhaps be argued that academic focus
on Soviet and Russian media has shifted according to
ew technological trends: television, the internet, and even blogs.
r
(Strangely enough, I am no exception.)

�

4

Liberty, Arch Puddington's Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty and Michael Nelson's War of the Black Heavens: The
Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War.
What is missing in existing accounts of RFE/RL is a departure from narrative; the
"stories" of the radios are purely descriptive--they do not analyze the radios as a strategic,
calculated move against Communism, and especially do not compare the stations to those
9
of the Soviet Union. This paper will eschew unnecessary anecdotes of the history of the
radio beyond what is vital for comprehending the complicated past of RFE/RL, and
instead focus on the duality of its broadcasting, the aforementioned double-fronted attack
on Communism in which RFE/RL went beyond what international stations like Voice of
America and the BBC did for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For the sake of
concision, the timeline focused on in this paper will not follow the entire trajectory of
RFE/RL history, but rather the beginning of the stations' broadcasts. For future study on
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, access to the Samizdat Archives located in Moscow
and Munich and the Hoover Archives would provide a comprehensive view of which

samizdat works were broadcasted as well as important information on programming
specifics unavailable in current print materials.
A textbook history of Soviet radio broadcasting
mother of radio,

,, ll

lO

begins: "Our country is the

illustrating that the Soviet Union truly adopted radio as its own

creation. While the exact location of the first radio broadcast in the world is debated,
following the Revolution of 1917, Russia proved an especially adept backdrop for the

Unnecessary for the sake of this research paper. The canon of RFE/RL narratives comprises many extremely well-researched and
interesting books from professionals and scholars who had personal experience with the stations for extended periods of time (and
especially notewOlthy, in a volatile time in the radios' histories). As my experience with RFE/RL is limited to a summer internship in
2008, I have no authority to add any additional anecdotal description; rather, I intend to add a new perspective on RFE/RL history.

9

10
II

A Soviet history of soviet radio broadcasting.
Hopkins 244

5

development of international broadcasting. The benefits of radio broadcasting
complemented the shortcomings of Russia's physical geography: unifying a country of
such sheer, unwieldy size could be accomplished with broadcasts that did not require
literacy or production materials (other than transmission technology) to reach the
population.
On a symbolic level, radio was instrumental in the project of nation building: it
encouraged national unity by providing a common, auditory link between people in far
removed regions and the center: everyone would be able to hear news from Mosco,v,
regardless of physical distance. Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovsky wrote a poem cal1 cd
,,12
that described radio as an auditory unifier and as the peoples' voice. He
"Radioagitator
exclaimed,

13

,, 14
According to
"What is read in Moscow, you can hear in Archangel'sk!

Mikhail Epstein, "[Russia] had come to occupy an area so large that finding its place in
time became somewhat difficult.

,, 15

Radio negates the limitations of spatial separation,

and instead relies on the advantages of temporality. The speed of radio waves provides an
almost instantaneous relay of information, covering the span of the Soviet Union's eleven
time zones exponentially faster than newspaper distribution ever could.
Thomas Guback and Steven Hill explain that after the Bolshevik Revolution in
1 9 1 7, the new leaders experienced the challenge of bringing a "large, culturally

amorphous collectivity into a technological, machine-oriented twentieth century.

,, 16

Technologically backward and vast, modernizing Russia presented a daunting task. In his
writings, Lenin demonstrates awareness of the fiscal advantages of radio broadcasts as
12

Pa)l.HOannaTop: someone who palticipates in radioagitatsia, or propaganda by means of radio broadcast.
Pa)l.HOafHTaTop, «Pa)l.HOra3eTa» # 100 (Radioagitator, "Radiogazeta" # I 00) ' May " 1925 in GOl]' aeva, 108 .
3
«KaK MO)({HO B MocKBe / lIHTaTb, / a H3 ApXaHreJIbCKa / CJrywaTb!»
15 Michael Epstein. "Russo-Soviet Topoi," in Dobrenko, 297.
16 Thomas H. Guback, and Steven P. Hill. The Innovation of Broadcasting in the Soviet Union and the
Role of V. I. Lenin, (Urbana:
The University of Illinois, 1972), 10.
13

4
1

6

opposed to published newspaper. In an article in Pravda Lenin wrote, " . . . there are
350,000 copies of Izvestia and 250,000 of Pravda for the whole of Russia. We are

paupers. We have no newsprint.

,, 17

As a new fonn of communication, radio would

potentially not only eliminate the paper shortages and the need printed material, but also
expedite the spread of Soviet revolutionary ideas. Vladimir Dmitrievich BonchBrunevich explains Lenin's aspirations for using radio for the enlightenment of the
masses: Lenin said "in every village there should be a radio . . . the country cannot live in
the dark: the newspapers come very slowly with delays, and now the radio, in our
condition of destruction, is especially important.

,, 18

Further, radio was a particularly

effective way of combining propaganda and agitation (agitprop), which persuaded masses
and enforced Communist values.

19

Aleksei Mikhailovich Bonch-Bruevich, a leading developer of Soviet radio
technology, received a personal note from Lenin, outlining the value the first Soviet
leader placed on radio: "The newspaper without pages and "without distance," that you
are creating will be an incredible achievement. I promise you my unlimited support in
this and similar endeavors.

,,20

Lenin's conceptualization of radio as an auditory fonn of

print pervaded far its development. Although Lenin viewed radio as a departure from the
printed newspaper fonn, he never considered it a separation and programming strongly
resembled material found in print; in fact, newspapers were often simply read over the
airwaves. The Central Committee broadcasted two newspapers over the radio : daily for

Ibid. 17.
«8. 11. J1eHHH H pa,Ll,HO» ("Y. I. Lenin and Radio"), in GOljaeva, 308 .
19 Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987 ),
20
«B. 11. J1eHHH -- M. A. EOH4 EpyeBH4Y» (Y. I. Lenin to M.A. Bonch-Bruevich), in GOljaeva, 18.
17
18

7

7.

workers , and 3-4 times a week for peasants.

21

The radiogazeta (radio newspaper)

editorial board was created from the editorial boards of print newspapers , but the unique
demands of oral newscasts led to the development of radio journalism and different
strategies of transmitting news.
The volume of radio broadcasting was frequently described "in terms of
newspaper pages , " even four decades after its conception.

22

Rather than a wholly distin(,t

media form , radio "tended to be viewed as a public address systeln for the printed
,,23
word.
Lenin asserted the value of developing radio in a letter to Nikolai Petrovich
Gorbunov , calling it an "action of great importance (the newspaper without pages and
without wires ... ) because all of Russia will listen to the newspaper read in Moscow" and
demanded that Gorbunov keep him updated of the radio progress at least twice a month.

24

Lenin charged a radio laboratory in Nizhny Novgorod with the development of a
25
central ratio station in Moscow with the capability of broadcasting 2000 verst. His
dedication to the spread of radio can be attributed to his belief that it was "absolutely
essential that communication facilities be extended with the radiotelephone so that many
,,26
could simultaneously hear a message or announcement.
Five Inillion rubles were
allotted to the project with the aim of broadcasting the "oral newspaper" by Ineans of
27
"loudspeaking telephones" (gromkogovoritel ') on six squares throughout the Moscow.
Shortwave radios intended to serve as outlets for in-country information became widely
available , and thus radio was not broadcasted only publicly, but also within private
21

«1-13 nOCTaHOBneHI1$1 UK BKn (6) «113,lJ,aHl1e pMl1ora3en> (,'From the Resolution of the Central Committee "Broadcasting of Radio
Newspapers"), March 22, 1926, in GOljaeva, 27.
22 Mark
W. Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union, (New York, NY: Pegasus, 1970), 254.
23 Ibid., 2
45 .
«B . 11. J1eHI1H--H. n. fop6YHOBY, 26 51HBapR 1921 rO,lJ,a» ("V. 1. Lenin--N. P. Gorbunov, January 26, 1921"), in GOljaeva, 19.
3,200 km. There are 1.6 kilometers per verst.
'
26 Guback,
Innovation, 12
7
2 «nO Ta
� �OBneHHe COBeTa TpY,lJ,a 11 060PHbI 06 opraHH3aQHI1 YCTHOH ra3eTbI» ("Decree of the Labor and Defense Soviet on the
Orgamzatlon of the Oral Newspapers"), in GOljaeva, 20.

�:

8

homes. He allotted the radio laboratory two and a half months to complete the project ,
emphasizing the expedited attempts to create sustainable broadcasting in Soviet Russia.

28

Despite the Civil War-induced electric energy shortage in 1 920, Nizhny Novgorod's
radio laboratory was given high priority: it was never limited in its use of energy
resources , and the laboratory workers were exempt from the state-wide draft.

29

Further, in

one of Lenin's dictation's to Stalin's (back then, one of the Commissars of the Soviet
National Council) office, he suggested utilizing financial resources from Soviet Russia's
3o
National Treasury, which held funds allocated only for emergencies.
Lenin did not
limit radio development in terms of energy or monetary funds , and he often exalted radio
broadcasting as the ultimate force of propaganda.
In the early days of Soviet Russia, radio occupied the private sector, but as the
political advantages of radio became apparent and the country entered the Civil War, the
31
military commandeered the airwaves. During the war, radio stations were subordinated
to the military command of marine and naval infantry, but radio grew into a more
multifaceted political tool that both informed and involved the Soviet citizens. The first
test of radio equipment in Moscow was on August 1 8 , 1 922 and soon after, the station ,
known as The Comintem Radio Station, broadcasted its first radio concert.

32

On October

27, the station began operating, though "the official opening was reserved for a special
occasion , November 7 , 1 922, the fifth anniversary of the Revolution.

28

,, 33

Lenin's voice

«riOCTaHoBneHHe COBeTa-Pa60LJe KpecThHHcKoH 060pOHhi 0 nOCTpOHKe lJ,eHl'PaJIhHOH pa.nHOTeneQlOHHoH CTaHlJ.HH ,n:eHCTBHH B
("Decree of the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Defense on Building a Central Radio Station with the Capability of
Broadcasting 2000 verst"), in Gotjaeva, 17.
29 Ibid, in GOljaeva, 18.
3 0 «DHchMa 8 .11. J1eHHHa 11. B. CTaJIHHY MH LJneHOB DOJ1l1T6IOpo IJ,K PDK (0) 0 pa3BHTHH pa.nHOTeXHHKH» ( Letter from V. I. Lenin
to I. V. Stalin for a Member of the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the Development of Radio
Technology), in Gotjaeva, 20-21.
3 1 «0 ueHTpaJIH3aUHH pa.nHoTexHH4ecKoro ,n:ena COBeTcKoM Pecny6nHKH» ("On the Centralization of Radio Technology for the Soviet
Republic"), in Gotjaeva, 15 .
32 Guback, Innovation 32.
33 Ibid., 33 .

2000 BepCT»

9

was heard over the air in photograph recordings of his speeches, and radio quickly spread
throughout Russia. As radio gained importance, its ownership was gradually completely
transitioned to the state. A decree from the Soviet National Commissars' Council entitled
"On the Centralization of Radio Technology for the Soviet Republic" outlines the plan
for transitioning radio to state ownership.

34

Through the Commissar of Post Offices and

Telegraphs, the Department of Radio Technology was created in order to Inaintain
control over what the radios transmitted.
The Party further encroached on broadcasting, essentially taking complete control
over radio stations. In a resolution from the Central Committee, "On Control of Radio
Broadcasting," the Communist Party asserts that all party committees on all territories
where stations are located should take control over the work of those stations "and use
them to the fullest extent in propaganda and educational purposes" as well as "assure
,, 35
political correctness of the materials broadcasted.
In order to carry out these goals,
local Party Committees were instructed to:

1 . Designate a responsible Party member as a leader of broadcasting who would
be responsible for the organizational aspects and the content of all [italics are
mine] broadcasted materials. This person will report to a relevant Party
committee.
2. To establish

mandatory [italics are mine] review of the plans and programs of

all broadcasting by the Party Committees.
3. Carefully select the presenters and lecturers that participate in

radioagitatsia,

thus creating a politically correct body of broadcasters.
4. Undertake measures to secure the microphones so that every broadcast will be

transmitted only with the permission of the responsible leader in charge of the
station.

34

«0 UeHTPaJlH3aUl-IH pa,uHOTeXHHQeCKOrO )1.e.l1a COBeTCKOH Pecny6.11H KH» ("On the Centralization of Radio Technology
for the Soviet
Republic"), in GOljaeva, 15.
35 «nOCTaHOB.I1eHHe �K BKn (E) «0 PYKOBO)1.CTBe pa,uHoBemaHHeM»
("The Resolution from the Central Committee "On Control of
Radio Broadcasting""), January 10, 1927, in Gotjaeva, 27.

10

5. Glavlit [the central censorship organization] . . . should have its designees present
36
in all radio transmitting stations.
Rather than just serving as an alternative media outlet to newspapers , radio was
recognized by the state as an especially vital form of propaganda: the "Central
Committee... acknowledges the organization of radioagitatsia

37 as an extremely important

and necessary task as a new weapon of propaganda among the masses.

,, 38

The Central

Committee announced that rather than just on main city squares , loudspeakers would be
placed in workers' clubs , peasants' clubs and village libraries.

39

The spread of radio

extended beyond Moscow and developed through the Soviet Union's periphery,
"targeting big industrial centers as well as the entire territory of the Soviet Union.

,,40

As

radio expanded outward geographically, it moved inward into the personal lives of
citizens of the Soviet Union.
Broadcasting extended beyond the political and infiltrated the personal sphere: the
general population's interest in radio culminated in the creation of various radio clubs
(called "Friends of Radio/Druz 'ia Radio"), uniting people interested in radio technology
and broadcasting. The Party immediately took special interest in these groups , suggesting
that the leadership of the organizations be chosen from Party members with appropriate
technological expertise.

41

However, the Party's intentions extended beyond simply

supplying technical support to hobby clubs , and were in fact quite transparent: the stated

3 6 «noCTaHOBJleHHe UK BKn (6) «0 PYKOBO.ll.CTBe pa.n.HoBelll,aHHeM» ("The Resolution from the Central Committee "On Control of
Radio Broadcasting""), January 10, 1927, in GOljaeva, 27 -8.
37 Propaganda by means of radio broadcasting.
38 «113 nOCTaHOBJleHHH UK pnK (D) «0 pa,lJ,HOarHTaI.J,HH»» ("From the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian
COlmnunist Party of Bolsheviks "On Radioagitatsia""), March 2, 1925 , in GOljaeva, 25 .
39 Ibid., in GOljaeva, 2 5 .
40 «113 nOCTaHOBJleHHH UK pnK (6) «0 pa,lJ,HOarHTaI.J,HH»» ("From the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian
Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On Radioagitatsia""), June 22, 1925 , in GOljaeva, 26.
41 «UHPKYJlHP UK PKn (6) «0 nOMOlll,H H PYKOBO.ll.CTBe opraHH3al.J,HHMH 06ll1,eCTBa .ll.pY3eH pa.n.HO (O,l1.P)»>> ("On Help and
Leadership in the Organization of the "Friends of Radio Clubs"), July 14, 1925, in GOljaeva 2 6-7.

11

reason for such attention to these clubs was that radio should play "as monumental means
of agitatsia and propaganda.

,,42

Pavel Mikhailovich Kerzhentsev, a theoretician of Soviet Culture and Chair of the
Soviet Radio Committee, outlined the tasks of radio committees, explaining that radio
and radio transmission obtained extremely political meanings: "the radio committees
became the quickest political newspapers that reach out to the farthest comers of the
Soviet Union faster than any other newspaper." He continues to explain that radio
encouraged "self-education,

,,43

as it transmitted works of literature and music, and

through those, promoted intellectual relaxation. Radio became a lauded, versatile media
form once its benefits were recognized, and "Next to mass media and film, radio is now
,, 44
the mightiest weapon of communist education for the masses.
In 1 924, Soviet Union began international radio broadcasting "as it is known
today, in voice and intended for listeners with their own radio sets.

,, 45

Anatoly

Vasilievich Lunacharsky, the Soviet People's Commissar for Education and
Enlightenment, gave a radio lecture

46

on November 23 , 1 924 on the "Culture of the

Soviet Union and the Importance of Radio.

,, 47

He spoke about the "magic abilities of

radio" and encouraged people to "say that we will use it for the unification of people and
exclaim 'hail to the radio! Hail to the continuing progress in the deep unification of
Communism for the future victory on the arena of class struggle that will end with the

2
4

43

44
45

Ibid,

27.

P.M. Kerzhentsev, "Program Article," Govorit SSSR, 3 no. 1 (1934), I .
Ibid.
Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Westem Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse NY: Syracuse UP ,
"

1997), 3 .
46

Pa,n,HOJ1eKl(HH
« YJ1bTypa CCCP H 3HaqeHHe pa,n,HO» ("Culture of the Soviet Union and the Importance of Radio"), November 2
3,
GOlJaeva 91.
47

�

12

1924 , in

48
creation of true human culture.", He declared the importance of radio in the unification
of workers and class struggle, and condemned bourgeois radio as an instrument of the
system of lies that protects the ideas needed for the ruling class. But, Lunacharsky
insisted, "we can reply to the bourgeois poison with a strong antidote provided by our
Communist press, our Communist film, and our Communist radio ...we know that we will
,,49
be able to clean radio from the stains put upon it by fatty bourgeois fingers.
In order to
ensure that radio adhered to Communist goals and evaded capitalist corruption, the
government considered it as an art form subject to Socialist Realism just as much as a
novel, painting, or musical composition.
The growth of radio coincided with the implementation of Socialist Realism as
the only permitted method of artistic expression in the Soviet Union, and adjusted its
broadcasting model according to the requirements outlined at the First Congress of Soviet
Writers in1934. Socialist Realism demanded of art the following four obligations: party
loyalty (partiinost ), ideological commitment (idenost ), accessibility of the art form for
'

'

the masses (narodnost ), and class-conscious works that supported the needs of the
'

proletariat (klassovost ).
'

Radio, by its very nature, epitomized the requirements of Socialist Realism. (I
would argue that radio is truly the most ideal form of mass media for any ideological
slant,

50

as a stream of auditory programming does not have the physical or visual space

that a book or film does in which to imbed suggestive plot details or make subversive
visual juxtapositions. Radio has no mise en scene, but is a solitary stream, and in its
limitations, radio asserts its power.) Since it moved from a private enterprise to state-run

48

49
50

Ibid., 94.
Ibid., 94.
Including democratic, as will b� discussed within the context of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

13

political entity, radio necessarily promoted party loyalty: it was illegal and impossible to
broadcast anything else. This can be extended to ideological commitment. As far as
accessibility, the desirability of radio for the Soviet Union resided in its appeal to the
broad masses. With no prerequisite of literacy or higher education, radio became a
socially (but not politically) neutral mode of communication.
In order to demonstrate true adherence to Socialist Realism, a work of art should
have displayed versatility that would allow for a seamless transposition between various
media forms. News printed in a physical newspaper should demonstrate the same
accessibility and clarity as news over the radio; literature in books should be able to
transition to an auditory narrative without any confusion. Thus, literature's role as
propaganda increased as plots and didactic messages previously constrained within the
pages of a book (and to the literate population) were broadcasted over the radio. In

an

article titled "The Writer and the Radio" in Govorit SSSR, an editorial explained: "Any

good [italics are mine--LN] work of Soviet literature is easy to translnit. ..Usually this
may result in shortening and simplifying some of the plot lines, but a good writer, a great
Soviet writer, should be able to adapt his work to the conditions of radio transmission.

,,51

In collective reply to the editorial, Soviet writers such as Aleksei Tolstoy, Yuri Tynianov,
and Mikhail Kazakov agreed that any important literary work should be transmittable by
52
radio. Transmissibility became a measurement of literary success, and since the
adaptation of literature to radio required writing clearly and unambiguously,
transmissibility became an egalitarian symbol of clarity and accessibility for everyone.

5
5

1

2

Govorit
Govorit

SSSR, 19 ( 1934 ), 10.
SSSR, 24 ( 1924), 5.

14

Literature was subordinated to the rules of radio transmission, and the methods of radio
shaped the production of literature.

53

In order to promote radio as a venue for literature, stations invited writers to
produce pieces for the radio. Kerzhentsev writes, "The work for radio should be
considered as extremely important so that the artists, writers , and musicians should feel
proud and privileged to perform in front of the microphone.

,,54

He insists that radio

transmission of works of literature should demonstrate two qualities: they should be
politically savvy and in tune with the demands of the time, and that "only those qualities
will bring radio transmission to the same level as press.

,,55

In addition to involving writers in a relationship of reciprocity, radio stations also
reached out to their audiences.

56

In the 1 930s, a new plane of communication was

developed as stations solicited letters from radio listeners, connecting the audience not
only on a political level but personal as well. Stations accepted letters from listeners,
allowing an interactive experience with the media. In 1 933, the Radio Committee
received 2-3,000 letters a month, and the following year, the number of letters jumped to
22-25 ,000 letters a month, illustrating the growing popularity of both radio listening and
listener involvement.

57

However, the widespread availability of radios did not always

serve to further Communist ideals� Radio waves could also provide access to alternative
voices, which spread knowledge that contradicted the Communist cause.
As Michael Nelson points out, "The irony of international broadcasting is that
what had been started by the Soviet Union ultimately became a significant factor in the

53

A similar relationship can be seen with RFE/RL and the literature it broadcasted over the airwaves. Even dissident literature is
necessarily subject to the time and sensory constraints of a radio broadcast.
54 Kerzhentsev, "Program," 28.
55 Ibid.
56 Yuri Murashov, "Sovetskii etos i radiofikatsiia pis'ma." Novae literaturnoe obozrenie 86 (2 00 7 ) : 57 .
57 Murashov, "Sovetskii," 57 .
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s
regime's own downfall." 8 The same shortwave radios that were used to listen to Soviet
broadcasts were eventually tuned into Western radio stations that contributed to the
ideological battle between the Soviet Union and Western powers. "One of the
peculiarities of Soviet space was its topological impermeability," explains Epstein, "the
notion that it could be understood only 'from the inside.' It was assumed to be
9
impenetrable to those located outside of it"S One of the successes of Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty is that an "inside" perspective is exactly what they intended to
broadcast.
From their creation as Cold War institutions, Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty aimed to provide alternative broadcasts to people throughout the Soviet {.Inion
and countries that fell victim to Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The st at1 0ns best
exemplify the clandestine exchange of information to and from the Soviet Union and its
Eastern European satellite states , when people and ideas silenced by the government
found alternate outlets of expression. They were unique in that they intended to provide
radio broadcasts that would act as surrogate home country programs , with regionally
specific news , rather than channeling American news and views into the countries as did
The Voice of America ( 1 942-present): "Only with Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty. . . did a country establish broadcast services whose purpose was to change the
form of government in foreign nations by airing news not about the country from which
the broadcasts originated, but about the countries that were the broadcast targets.

,,60

Thus,

the broadcasting practices of these stations will be used as case studies to investigate how

Nelson, War, 1.
Mikhail Epstein, "Russo-Soviet Topoi," in The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space, eds. Evgeny
Dobrenko and Eric Naiman, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 297.
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radio broadcasting led to the spread of democratic ideas in the Soviet Union and East
European countries.
J ames Critchlow describes how media transitioned when "wartime cooperation
between the Soviet Union and its Western allies degenerated into Cold War tension.

,,61

In

order to combat the growing power of Soviet media, Western governments started using
shortwave radios and Britain and the United States began directly broadcasting into the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

62

Both The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

and The Voice of America (VOA) can be considered strictly "Western" broadcasting
stations, as they spoke for their home countries (giving VOA something of an eponymous
mission), while the United States-funded Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty served as
"surrogate" home stations for the countries to which they broadcasted, "attempting to
provide listeners with the kind of domestically oriented programs that they might expect
from their own radio stations if the latter were free of censorship.

,,63

While the concept of giving "voice to the voiceless" is powerful on its own, the
more immediate goal of RFE/RL--to provide news to countries where it is heavily
censored--can also be counted as a great contributor to undermining the Soviet
government. K.J. McNamara explains that behind every provider of alternative
information is a source of authority (in the case of RFE/RL, this authority is the U. S.
64
government). Communist governments , which "monopolize information in order to
legitimize their power" are therefore compromised when a new source of information is
present.

65

Foreign broadcasts made available facts and news that Soviet media withheld

James Critchlow, "Westem Cold War Broadcasting." Joumal of Cold War Studies 1
Ibid.
63 Ibid., 2.
64 KJ. McNamara, "Reaching Captive Minds with Radio." Orbis 36 , no. 1 (1992): 31.
65 Ibid.
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(1999): 168-75 .

from the population, and by doing this, they undermined totalitarian regimes by "ending
,,66
the information monopoly
within the countries' borders.
During World War II, the United States created a propaganda agency, the Office
of War Information (OWl) , and simultaneously created the VOA.

67

When the war came

to an end, the VOA's budget was significantly decreased, and there was unrest among
Congress members who believed that the United States no longer had a role in
international broadcasting.

68

However, when the threat of Communism to the United

States emerged from the Soviet Union and satellite countries of Eastern Europe, the
United States saw an opportunity for a revised role in radio broadcasting. Since "the
Soviets and local Communists moved expeditiously to silence opposition voices,
eliminate an independent press , outlaw non-Communist political parties, neutralize
,,69
religion, and seal off borders from foreign influence,
General Lucius Clay announced
the need for something other than Voice of America. He called for a station that did not
j ust share news about America, but "would speak to each country behind the Iron Curtain
in its own language, and from the throats of its own leaders who fled for their lives
because of their beliefs in freedom."

70

While his call to order is rather grandiose and

dramatic, this is indeed what the United States did with its new approach to international
broadcasting.
In considering why the United States government chose to continue international
radio broadcasting as opposed to developing new technologies (television broadcasts ,
newspapers, etc.) , the same issues present in the early days of Soviet Union reappear.

66

Ibid., 32.
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Although the nations held different intentions with their broadcasts and began decades
apart, the core benefits of radio maintained a high level of importance. While the Soviet
Union overcame its geographical obstacle in uniting the country across a vast expanse of
land, the United States faced a similar problem: in promoting the message of democracy,
they were

an

71
ocean away. The struggle with literacy remained, as well as the issue of

practicality: newspapers required significant amounts of materials and even more relevant
to the American case, physical distribution. It would be both incredibly difficult
(impossible) and dangerous for the citizens of countries to which the U. S. broadcasted if
subversive newspapers were printed and passed out to the population.

72

Further, there is

something significant about the idea of simultaneous listening, even if only on a symbolic
level. In the Soviet Union, people from Leningrad to Irkutsk to Vladivostock were united
73
by listening to the Moscow news at the same time , providing the feeling that the
country was not disjoint, but united in its struggle against bourgeois corruption. In the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, citizens faced unspeakable terror and persecution, and
on a more superficial but no less important level was "how lonely everyone felt and how
cut off from the greater tradition of Western learning and thought.

,,74

With American

broadcasts, tuning into foreign stations provided the hope that someone else was also
listening--a hope that there was someone else with opposing ideas. Thus, an alternative
community of free thinkers was proIT!pted.
If propaganda is stripped of its Communist/Socialist connotations, then Soviet
and American radio followed essentially the same process: in order to best "distribute"

71 Moreover, since the U.S. broadcasted to multiple countries with multiple languages, radio again proved economical as instead of
printing five different versions of the same news--a considerable use of capital--translators could instead be used.
72 It is interesting to note that at one point, Radio Free Europe did have a balloon campaign, where they sent millions of leaflets across
the border of the Iron Curtain.
73 The news was always broadcasted according to Moscow time.
74 Marcin Krol, "Listening through the Jamming." American Scholar 61, no. 3 (1992) : 2.
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propaganda, each nation turned to the powerful force of radio. This is true for RFE/RL as
well as VOA and BBC , but RFE/RL departs from other western stations in that they did
not simply use the Soviet Union's mass media of choice against the government who first
advocated radio , but also their own citizens.
The sizable population of displaced people following WWII--people who escaped
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to major international cities--presented an
opportunity for the U.S. government to use them as a "powerful force against their
communist controlled homelands .

,,75

The NCFE recognized an opportunity to establish

mutually beneficial relationships with refugees: in exchange for employment, the
population of emigres could provide an invaluable wealth of knowledge: "Many of the
refugees had been leaders in the societies from which they had emigrated, and their
backgrounds could be used to obtain a better understanding of the techniques and devices
that were being used by the Communists to undermine the democratic governments.

,,76

Emigres were valuable not only in their oppositional views to their former govermnents ,
but also because they provided the ultimate source of cultural knowledge and kne�N ho,,,,
to "appeal to their former fellow citizens.

,,77

George Kennan, often called "the father of

,,7
our proj ect 8 even though he was never officially affiliated with the radios , spearheaded
the creation of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) , asking Ambassador
Joseph Grew to organize civilians into an anticommunist organization "that was
dedicated to returning democracy to Eastern Europe, using the talents of the refugees.

�: C!ssie.Dore Hill, "Vo�ces of Hope: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty." Hoover Digest, no. 4 (2001), 1.
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,,79

1983 ) 2.

81
8o
In1949, The NCFE , initially headed by Allen Dulles and then by Joseph Grew,
announced its official objectives as an organization.
The goal of the radios was not limited to providing truthful news, "but also to
bring about the peaceful demise of the Communist system and the liberation of what were
known as satellite nations.

,,82

In order to do so , the NCFE made it apparent that exile

relations were a main priority,83 and initial radi084 plans were quite simple: exiled leaders
and scholars 85 were provided with microphones and "given free rein to speak to their
countrymen.

,,86

The outlined plan for the exiles can be summarized into three main goals:

to find occupations for the exiles , to put their voices on the air, and to allow the exiles to
7
experience democracy. 8 The latter goal is rather vague, but to extrapolate further, the
government wanted exiles to see democracy "in action," with the hope that this would
add credibility to the broadcasts. Rather than simply being seen as disaffected exiles from
the USSR and Eastern Europe, what a testament to democracy if they were also
converted! Radio Free Europe (RFE) executives recruited nationals from the five
countries to which the station intended to broadcast: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania.

88

RFE employed emigres abroad and in the United States, though the station widely
drew upon the population in New York, as it was "the preferred destination for those
among the intellectual elite who were fed up with Soviet restrictions, Soviet censorship,

80

Initially known as the Free Europe Committee (FEC).
In addition to Dulles and Grewe, the board comprised powerful and influential members, among them Dwight Eisenhower, fonner
attorney general Francis Biddle, Dewitt Wallace (owner of Reader's Digest), and Henry Luce of Time, Inc.
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9
Soviet poverty, and especially, Soviet hypocrisy." 8 RFE could recruit from a talented
population of reporters, writers, poets, musicians, and commentators, who having been
grudging adherents to the Soviet system, were willing to discuss the negative attributes
and the "facts about the natural disasters and man-made catastrophes that were
systematically covered up by Soviet authorities.

,,9o

The relationship between RFE and the

emigre population (while some may call it exploitative) involved a fair amount of
reciprocity, as "Radio Free Europe was a very important--for some the sole--source of
,,91
income
for Polish, Hungarian, and Czech writers and intellectuals in exile.
9
RFE's first official broadcastwas on July 4, 2 1950 from West Germany, though
it was "little more than an announcement of the impending commencement of regular
programming" which began on July14 on Bastille Day, significant in Europe as Jay of
revolution against tyranny.

93

The first broadcasts were sent to Czechoslovakia, and then

later in the year to Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.

94

The next year on May1

(symbolic as May Day is a workers' holiday and particularly important in Communist
countries) broadcasting began from a larger transmission facility in Holzkirchen,
Germany� near Munich.

95

Munich eventually became the official headquarters of RFE for

a variety of reasons: it was convenient and necessary to have a European production site,
West Germany shared a border with Czechoslovakia and Poland so it was geographically
strategic, and many emigres lived there.
The NCFE was funded through the CIA (by Congress) unti11972, but preferred to
present itself as a private enterprise funded by the donations of Americans dedicated to
89

90

91
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Where RFE/RL was headquartered until its move to Prague.
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the cause of freedom. A New York Times article explains, "Radio Free Europe, which
went on the air on July 4, and is scheduled to begin regular operations on July 14,
promises to be one of the unique operations in the history of broadcasting. Financed as a

private venture by a group ofAmerican citizens, [italics are mine--LN] with the public at
large invited to participate through individual subscription, the outlet is designed to be
'the voice of freedom.

,,,96

To emphasize the supposed private investment into the NCFE,

another organization--the Crusade for Freedom--was created to encourage even more
funding for Radio Free Europe.

97

The Crusade's "mascot" was a 1 O-ton bell with a

"laurel wreath symbolizing peace encircling the top and a frieze of five figures
representing the five races of humankind passing the torch of freedom.
displayed the bell throughout cities in America,

99

,, 98

The committee

rallying citizens who believed in the

values set forth by Radio Free Europe, and securing funding that although not enough to
contribute substantially, did demonstrate the public support of the Crusade.
Accompanying the parades were pithy slogans:
and "Help Truth Fight Communism,

,, IOl

100

"Fight the Big Lie with the Big Truth"

and Americans signed "freedom scrolls" and

,,102
contributed "truth dollars.
As RFE successful gained listeners in Eastern Europe and tensions increased
between the United States and USSR, the CIA resolved to pursue a similar endeavor in
the Soviet Union, and thus was born RFE's sister station Radio Liberty. Prior to Radio
Liberty's first broadcast, John Foster Dulles (president-elect Dwight Eisenhower's
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secretary of state designate) appealed before senate, asking for "liberation of the captive
peoples.

,,103

In early March, 1 953 under the auspices of the American Committee for the

Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Amcomlib), Radio Liberation (eventually changed to
Radio Liberty) debuted.

104

Soon after its first few broadcasts, Radio Liberty, was

confronted with the story of Stalin's death on March 5, 1 95 3 , assigning it the symbolic
meaning of an end of an era of Terror.
In order to illustrate the "duality" of RFE/RL's broadcasting--that is, the radios
broadcasted both from the United States as a foreign news source as well as broadcasting
"internal" information, such as literature--a discussion of samizdat105 literature is helpful.

Samizdat included works of political dissent, "but also included literary works that failed
to receive the official seal of approval, as well as information on human rightS.,

, 1 06

The

idea of samizdat translated into other forms of media, including radio, resulting in the
term radizdat. 107 Often, these samizdat publications would be smuggled to the West.
Radio Liberty had

an

archive of these materials, and also broadcasted some of the

documents over the air, right back to the public who was denied access to these works by
the Soviet government.
Radio Liberty in particular served an important role for dissident Soviet writers
who could not publish their works through government-supported presses: the station
frequently broadcasted samizdat writings and collected

an

important archive of samizdat

works in Munich. Radio Liberty published samizdat documents in weekly bulletins over
1 03

James Critchlow, Radio Hole-in-the-Head: An Insiders StOry of Cold War Broadcasting, (Washington, D.C: American UP,
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ill p�stulates t 1at the reason Radio Liberty is even less known than RFE is because there was no "fanfare, promotion, and fund
ralsmg WIth celebnty chainnen" ( 4 ). Rather, Radio Liberty maintained a low profile.
105 Translated fr m
�
�ssian, samizdat means "self-printed" and the tenn is applicable to underground, clandestine publications that
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,

the radio (Materialy SamizdatalMateri als of Samizdat).

108

'

The words of authors like

Boris Pasternak, Joseph Brodsky, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Siniavskii, and
countless others were broadcasted over the radio, presenting a revolutionary alternative to
printed samizdat material.

109

Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago was serialized and

broadcasted on RFE's Polish Service in I 5-minute intervals.

l lo

Marcin Krol remembers

hearing Witold Gombrowicz and Czeslaw Milosz who may have been "entirely forgotten
but for the opportunity to communicate with their countrymen over Radio Free
Europe.

,,111

While in many ways it can be argued that RFE/RL essentially "preached to

the converted,

,,112

this in no way underscores its importance. For many listeners of

,,113
RFE/RL, "the broadcasts were their only contact with the outside world
The great
success of RFE/RL even apart from its contribution to the downfall of the USSR is that it
raised awareness about an alternative thought venue, and people who held subversive
views were connected in a community of listeners with the potential to eventually bring
recognition to their struggles.

114

RFE and RL did not broadcast without opposition from the target countries.

115

From the beginning of its broadcasts, RFE "became the fiercely hated enemy of all
totalitarian leaders in Eastern Europe.
in 1 953

117

,,116

Within seconds of Radio Liberty'S broadcasts

, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries reacted by j amming the

radio waves: on the same frequencies as the radio stations, they simultaneously

Ibid., 7 .
Printed samizdat works were often hand-written on carbon-copy paper and passed from reader to reader, a dangerous method of
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,,11
broadcasted shrieks, howls, or white noise ("KGB jazz 8) which effectively garbled
RFE and RL' s transmissions.

119

Krol asserts that the importance of RFE

120

can be seen in

the reaction Communist powers had to the broadcasting--they did everything in their
power to stop the transmissions.

121

He recalls his father listening to the radio and hearing

"enormous screeches, drumming sounds, and mysterious bleeps . . . until, finally, father
found what he wanted.

,, 122

However, even the j amming served to have a "positive effect

on morale for us in Munich," according to James Critchlow.

123

Although the Soviet Union and East European countries attelnpted to block out
the transmissions from RFE/RL, people were still able to tune into the stations. Gene
Sosin argues that the regime could have "saved millions of rubles in electronic costs and
man hours simply by confiscating all radios and using loudspeakers exclusively."

124

However, the vast network of personal radios throughout the Soviet Bloc made this
highly impractical. By taking away the population ' s personal radios, Communist
governments would not only remove the influence of RFE/RL: they would also
effectually remove their own strategic placement in the homes of their citizens, taking the
history of radio full circle.
In a celebratory speech for the tenth anniversary of Soviet broadcasting, Lenin s
l

widow, Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, elucidates radio ' s continued strengths while
simultaneously comparing Soviet radio to radio broadcasts of capitalist countries: "Radio
broadcasting is of enormous importance. It takes out of oblivion the most far removed
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considers RFE to be the "most brilliant move against communism--more important, in [his] view, than embargoes, nuclear
weapons, and various diplomatic and military pressures" (1).
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comers of the USSR. It brings knowledge into the broad masses, it propagates, helps the
masses to organize themselves anew. . . If in the capitalist countries radio broadcasting
disorients and disorganizes masses , in the Soviet Union, the radio remains a great
instrument of Socialist construction.

,,125

Her words can be considered premonitory: while

the Soviet Union and East European countries utilized radio as a constructive tool,
Western stations such as RFE/RL hijacked the radio infrastructure and methods created
by Soviet and East European governments, and used them to perpetuate their own form
of propaganda. Despite the Soviet Union's attempts to continue its task of nation
building, capitalist broadcasts from RFE/RL undermined totalitarian governments and
disorganized their listeners.
RFE/RL aimed to tell the truth, as well as provide a voice for the opposition. They
broadcasted not as American stations (though they most certainly adhered to democratic
ideals), but as "surrogate" stations that catered news and broadcasts to citizens living in
each country to which RFE/RL broadcasted. To further the potency of their broadcasts,
they utilized the cultural knowledge and experience of a sizable emigre community.
While its role in the dissolution of the USSR is debated, RFE/RL smartly capitalized on
elements of Soviet system: the emigre population and methods of broadcasting that Lenin
himself advocated. Using former Soviet and East European citizens against their former
homelands, and further, using the media form developed and advocated by Lenin himself
to promote an anti-Communist dialog, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty eventual
produced a mutual process of broadcasting--the Soviet Bloc was able to hear the world,
and the world was able to hear the Soviet Bloc.

«npHBeTCTBHe no cJIyqalO 1 0-JIeTHH coeTcKoro pa.nHoBemaHHH» ("CelebratOly Speech for the 10th Anniversary of Soviet
Broadcasting"), 1 934, in Gorjaeva 363.
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